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Wednesday, February 5, 2014

Struggling With Nullification?

Does a state have the right to nullify federal statutes the state considers unconstitutional? 

This depends largely on how you define “nullification.” It also depends on what you mean by “right” and what kind of document you understand the Constitution to be. In other words, it depends on your premises.

Unfortunately, people often discuss—and debate, and attack each other over—the merits or demerits of nullification without making their premises clear. The result is much quarreling among people who are fundamentally on the same side.

Historically, “nullification” was defined quite narrowly. It referred to a formal ordinance of a state legislature or state convention that declared a federal law void within the boundaries of the state. The state might or might not make the ordinance conditional, and it might or might not impose criminal or civil penalties on persons attempting to enforce the federal enactment. We can refer to this as the narrow, or historical, definition of nullification. It is traditionally credited to the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, drafted by Thomas Jefferson.

Today the term often is used in a much broader sense by advocates, by opponents, and often by the press.  So used, it refers as well to other mechanisms a state may deploy to assert its prerogatives against federal overreaching—that is, to other methods of what James Madison called “interposition.” The Tenth Amendment Center often uses “nullification” in this broad way.

Thus, “interposition” (by Madison’s definition) or “nullification” (by a broad definition) can refer to state actions such as:

*    State legislative and executive expressions of opinion against a federal measure;
*    State lobbying pressure to get the measure changed or repealed;
*    State-sponsored lawsuits against federal actions deemed unconstitutional;
*    Political coordination among states to promote change or repeal;
*    Refusal of states to accept federal grants-in-aid attached to obnoxious conditions;
*    Refusal of states to allow their officials to cooperate in the execution of federal programs;
*    Refusal of states to render a particular activity that is a federal crime illegal under state law as well (e.g., the use of marijuana in Colorado and Washington); and
*    The state application and convention process of Article V.
Constitutional wonks will recall that Madison anticipated most of these in Federalist No. 46, and included the others in later writings.

All of the interposition methods listed above are perfectly legal and constitutional. For example, there is certainly no requirement that a state duplicate federal crimes in its own statute books, and the Supreme Court has said repeatedly (and held expressly in the NFIB v. Sebelius, the Obamacare case) that the federal government may not “commandeer” state officials in service of federal policy.

Clearly, calling these modes of interposition “nullification” does not render them unconstitutional or wrong.

On the other hand, there are methods of interposition that the Constitution does not authorize. In other words, they are extra-constitutional

Nevertheless, the Founders believed that natural law reserves them to the people in some circumstances.

The most dramatic illustration of an extra-constitutional remedy reserved by natural law is the right of armed revolution, which Madison also discussed in Federalist No. 46. He later stressed that the people should resort to extra-constitutional methods only when the constitutional compact has been irretrievably broken.

Both historically and today, the most serious nullification disputes center on whether states enjoy the constitutional prerogative of adopting formal nullification ordinances. In other words: Does a state have the constitutional power to void what it perceives to be an unconstitutional federal law? READ MORE